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Abstract
We explore the effect of military fatalities from World War I on female labor par-
ticipation in post-war France. We build a unique dataset containing individual level
information for all 1.3 million fallen soldiers, and find that the tightness of the marriage
market along with negative income shocks generated by the scarcity of men induced
many young single women and older widows to enter the labor force permanently after
the war, especially in the industrial sector. These findings are robust to alternative em-
pirical strategies, including an instrumental variables strategy based on idiosyncrasies
generated by the recruitment process of the army. (JEL J12, J16, J22, N34)
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“The major fact will be the breakdown of the equilibrium between the sexes.
There will not be enough suitors for all young women in search of a husband. [...]
The prospect of remaining single will induce most young women to worry about
getting an occupation to make their living and to be self-sufficient.”
Arthur Girault, La Revue d’E´conomie Politique, 1915, 29 (6), pp. 443-444.
I. Introduction
War, sex-selective abortion, and mass migration alter gender balances throughout the
world. As a result, the ratio of men to women frequently diverges from its natural balance of
106 men for every 100 women.1 For example, Klasen and Wink (2003) estimate that about
80 million women were “missing” in China and India in 2000. Imbalances in sex ratios can
have far-reaching consequences; specifically, a shortage of men may disrupt marriage market
and female labor market equilibria (see, e.g., Abramitzky et al. 2011, Angrist 2002). In this
paper, we analyze how sex ratio imbalances due to World War I (WWI) impacted the French
female labor market. We find that these imbalances induced many women to enter the labor
force throughout the interwar period.
Identifying the effect of gender imbalances on labor market outcomes is often difficult
because these imbalances are usually the product of factors that also shape labor market
structures. For instance, Carranza (2014) shows that part of the sex ratio imbalances across
Indian districts can be explained by variations in soil textures, as they generate differences
in women’s employment opportunities in agriculture, thereby affecting the economic value of
girls. We overcome endogeneity issues by interpreting WWI as a severe exogenous shock to
the adult sex ratio. While WWI ravaged continental Europe between 1914 and 1918, France
suffered an especially high death toll relative to other belligerent countries. Because of a
universal conscription system, most French male citizens were drafted throughout the war:
out of a total of 10 million men aged 15 to 50 before the war, 8 million were drafted in the
army. About 1.3 million of them died in combat; a military death rate of 16%. As a result,
the adult sex ratio dropped from 98 men for every 100 women at the onset the war to 88
men for every 100 women by the end of the war.2 As shown in figure 1, it was not until after
World War II (WWII) that the pre-WWI adult sex ratio was restored.
Using a unique dataset of military fatalities at the individual level, which we constructed,
we examine how this sharp shock affected female labor participation in the interwar period.
1By natural balance, we refer to the sex ratio at birth. It is determined by biology, and excludes the impact
of external interventions such as sex-selective abortions (see, e.g., Coale 1991, Klasen and Wink 2003).
2The adult sex ratio is usually around 100 men for every 100 women because of a higher natural mortality
of boys compared to girls (see, e.g., Klasen and Wink 2003).
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Figure 1. Adult Sex Ratio (1900-2014)
Figure 1 notes: Yearly data between 1900 and 2014. The first vertical rays (1914-1918) indicate WWI. The
second vertical rays (1939-1945) indicate WWII.
Our empirical strategy exploits differential changes in female labor participation before and
after WWI across de´partements with varying levels of military death rates.3 We find that
military fatalities shifted female labor participation upward; an effect that persisted through-
out the interwar period. Figure 2 displays the raw relationship between military death rates
and changes in female labor participation across all de´partements. While there is no relation-
ship between military fatalities and pre-war changes in female labor participation between
1901 and 1911 (figure 2, panel (a)), each additional percentage point of military death rate
is associated with an increase of about half a percentage point in female labor participation
between 1911 and 1921 (figure 2, panel (b)). The baseline difference-in-differences estimates
confirm this relationship: in de´partements that experienced a military death rate of 20%
rather than 10%—equivalent to switching from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the dis-
tribution—female labor participation was about 4 percentage points higher throughout the
interwar period, compared to an average participation rate of 31% before the war. That
3French de´partements are one of the three levels of government below the national level. There were 87
de´partements before the war, and 90 after the war. The three new de´partements belonged to Germany
before the war. The interwar period is the period between the end of WWI and the beginning of WWII.
This paper focuses on changes of female labor participation in the interwar period for the following reasons.
First, it was not until after WWII that the sex ratio was restored to its pre-WWI level. Hence, should we
observe disruptions resulting from WWI after WWII, the mechanisms at play should be different than the
ones we explore here. Second, though much lower, military fatalities from WWII could confound any effect
we attribute to WWI. Finally, the measurement of female labor participation changed after WWII, so that
the results may not be comparable across time.
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Figure 2. WWI Military Death Rate and Changes in Female Labor Participation
Figure 2 notes: FLP is female labor participation rate in percents. The changes are in percentage points.
Each dot represents a de´partement.
is, these de´partements experienced an increase in female labor participation of about 12%
compared to pre-war levels. At the mean of the data, this implies that losing 10 men during
the war induced 2 women to enter the labor force. We find that this phenomenon was driven
by women entering the industrial sector rather than the service sector.
Subsequently, we explore the validity of the identifying assumption, i.e., that counterfac-
tual trends in female labor participation would have been the same across all de´partements
had they experienced similar military death rates. Military death rates were not randomly
distributed across de´partements—more rural de´partements experienced more military fatal-
ities. Using an array of historical evidence, we show that this correlation was generated by
the policies implemented by the Ministe`re de la Guerre (the Ministry of War) to sustain the
industrial war effort. Importantly, this correlation does not invalidate the identification as
military death rates were not correlated with pre-war trends in female labor participation.
Nonetheless, to increase the credibility of the identification strategy, we relax the parallel
trend assumption in four ways. First, we control for de´partement-specific trends in female
labor participation. Second, using Bonhomme and Manresa’s (2015) grouped fixed effects,
we allow for time-varying heterogeneity across groups of de´partements, where we do not
impose any a priori structure on group membership. Third, exploiting the fact that the
recruitment process of the army led to randomness in military death rates, we use an instru-
mental variables approach combined with the difference-in-differences strategy. Finally, we
run the analysis separately on groups with similar pre-war observable characteristics. All
empirical strategies lead to comparable results, which are in line with the baseline estimates.
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Compared to the well-documented effect of WWII mobilization on female labor partici-
pation in the U.S. (Goldin 1991, Acemoglu et al. 2004, Goldin and Olivetti 2013), the effect
we identify is driven by a different mechanism, and has a larger magnitude.4 The increase
in female labor participation in the U.S. after WWII was driven by women who entered the
labor force during the war and continued working afterwards. On the contrary, we find that
the increase in female labor in France was driven by women who entered the labor force af-
ter the war. Furthermore, our analysis of marital status data along with labor participation
data in a causal mediation framework suggests that labor supply factors related to marriage
market conditions are responsible for this increase in female labor participation. On the one
hand, many young single women had to enter the labor force while searching longer for a
husband because of the tightness of the post-war marriage market. On the other hand, many
older war widows had to enter the labor force to compensate for the loss of their husbands’
incomes. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that women who entered the labor force dur-
ing the war continued working after the war: consistent with contemporaneous observations
by labor inspectors, firms only assigned elementary tasks to women during the war, limiting
their opportunities to acquire transferable skills. Moreover, the government set up incentives
for women to surrender the job they held during the war to returning soldiers.
We then explore whether other mechanisms can explain the patterns we find in the data.
By analyzing the evolution of real wages of men and women before and after the war, we
find no evidence that firms increased their demand for female labor relative to male labor.
Instead, firms increased their stock of physical capital in de´partements that suffered more
military fatalities, suggesting that the increase in female labor participation was not the
result of firms substituting across input factors. We also explore the possibility that the
war changed men’s beliefs about gender roles, inducing an increase in the demand for female
labor. Using changes in the support to the extension of the suffrage to women in the Assemble´
Nationale (the French lower house) between 1914 and 1919 as a proxy for changes in beliefs
about gender roles, we find no evidence for this mechanism.
The reminder of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section discusses
the literature related to our research. Section III describes the data and historical context,
section IV presents the main results, and section V explores the mechanisms behind our
findings.
4Acemoglu et al. (2004, table 8, column 2) find that “a 10 percentage point increase in the mobilization rate
in the U.S. during WWII is associated with one to three percentage points of additional growth in female
labor force participation over [the 1950s]” (p. 528).
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II. Related Literature
A broad literature has analyzed the impact of war mobilization and of military fatalities
on female labor participation. It has mostly focused on the impact of WWII mobilization
in the U.S.5 In general, this literature finds that war mobilization during WWII increased
female labor supply in the 1950s and 1960s (Goldin 1991, Acemoglu et al. 2004, Goldin and
Olivetti 2013). Exploring the heterogeneity in the impact of WWII, Goldin and Olivetti
(2013) find that the effect was primarily driven by higher-educated white married women
who were young during the war (25 to 34 years old in 1950).6. WWII mobilization also
affected the type of occupations held by women after the war, with a shift toward blue collar
occupations and away from white collar occupations (Bellou and Cardia 2016). Relative to
this literature, we contribute to the understanding of the effect of war on subsequent female
labor in several ways. Besides shedding light on an alternative mechanism, the extent of
military fatalities from WWI enables us to focus on the impact of a permanent rather than
a temporary shortage of men. While the effect of the war is similar to the U.S. case in that
female labor participation increases, it is much more persistent. For instance, we see no
decline in the effect of the missing men on female labor participation throughout the entire
interwar period. As a comparison, the impact of WWII mobilization on female labor in the
U.S. faded out in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the qualitative nature of the effect we find
is different: while WWII in the U.S. induced women to enter the labor force because of
the disruptions generated by the war-production effort (Bellou and Cardia 2016), WWI in
France induced women to enter the labor force because of the disruptions to the marriage
market generated by the missing men.
We also contribute to the literature exploring the effect of sex ratio imbalances on female
labor market outcomes. The proportion of men to women diverges from its natural balance
in many instances. The term “missing women” was coined by Amartya Sen (1992, 2003) who
estimated that 100 million women were missing in Asia and North Africa. Such a magnitude
has been confirmed by alternative demographic models (Coale 1991, Klasen 1994, Klasen
and Wink 2003). The causes and consequences of this phenomenon have been subject to
intense scrutiny in economics (see, e.g., Oster 2005). For example, Qian (2008) shows that,
because of the comparative advantage of women in picking tea in rural China, the increase in
the value of tea in the early 1980s generated a rise in female income. This, in turn, increased
5On the bias of empirical economic history toward the case of the US, see Abramitzky (2015, Figure 3).
To our knowledge, the only two papers analyzing another case are Kreibaum and Klasen (2015), which
studies the impact of war-related fatalities from the Vietnam war on female labor participation, and Eder
(2016), which studies the impact of war-related fatalities from WWII in Austria on structural change of
the economy.
6See also (Jaworski 2014) for an analysis of the impact of WWII mobilization in the U.S. on female education.
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survival rates of girls, and balanced the sex ratio in favor of women. Other research focuses
on the effect of sex-specific migration patterns. For instance, Angrist (2002) studies the
consequences of changes in immigrant sex ratios in the U.S. between 1910 and 1940 on the
marital and labor behavior of second-generation immigrants. He argues that these changes
were mostly driven by exogenous changes in U.S. immigration laws. He finds that higher sex
ratios (a relative shortage of women) induced women to marry more often, and decreased
their labor participation. In the context of a developing country, Conover et al. (2015)
analyze the contemporaneous effects of the scarcity of men in Mexico due to large-scale
labor migrations to the U.S. Using variations in migration across Mexican states and cohorts,
Conover et al. (2015) find that a reduction in sex ratios increased female labor participation,
especially in high skilled jobs. Compared to this literature, the source of variation in sex
ratio we use allows us to improve upon identification because it is sharper—military fatalities
are concentrated within a period of about 4 years—larger in magnitude, and exogenous to
the outcome under scrutiny.
More generally, we contribute to the literature studying the impact of WWI on female
labor. Our unique dataset of military fatalities enables us to challenge both the popular view
that the war “liberated women”, and the commonly held academic view that the war was a
mere “parenthesis” for female labor, by showing that it induced many women to enter the
labor force permanently.7 Moreover, we improve upon Abramitzky et al. (2011), who study
the short-run effects of military fatalities on the post-war marriage market in France.8
III. Data and Historical Context
A. Female Labor Participation (1901-1936)
We collected female labor participation data at the de´partement level before and after
the war by transcribing tables from the seven French censuses from 1901 to 1936.9 Starting
7For instance, Franc¸oise The´baud concludes her seminal study on women during WWI by “[t]he war, which
brought hundreds of thousands of women into factories and male sectors, appears at least in part as a
parenthesis” (The´baud 2013, p. 406). Other historians qualify this idea: “[w]ould the war have been a
parenthesis in the long history of female labor? This assessment is also debatable, and one can assert from
now on that the war accelerated female labor in the industry and in the offices” (Zancarini-Fournel 2005,
p. 59) See Downs (1995), Schweitzer (2002), Battagliola (2010), and Maruani and Meron (2012) for other
historical accounts of women in the French labor market throughout the twentieth century. Similarly,
economists such as Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 131) notice that “changes in the female labor market that
occurred during the war were reversed upon the end of the war with the return of men to their civilian
jobs.”
8Appendix J gives more precision on the added value of our data compared to previously available measures,
such as those in Abramitzky et al. (2011) and in Vandenbroucke (2014).
9The census years available are: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. See appendix K for more
details on the sources and definitions of the variables used in the analysis. All the data used in this paper
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from 1801, the census was carried out every five years, except during war years. It was not
until the census of 1901 that female labor was consistently recorded. However, the census
of 1901 is not fully comparable to later censuses: while wives of farmers were supposed to
be systematically recorded as “in the labor force”, the French statistical office recognized
that not all local census agents followed this directive (Daric 1947, pp. 13-14). For this
reason, we focus on female labor net of the wives of farmers throughout the analysis. Wives
of farmers were systematically classified as chefs d’e´tablissement in farming whenever they
were recorded.10 By subtracting them, we avoid this potential measurement concern as
almost all female chefs d’e´tablissement in farming were farmers’ wives.11 Moreover, this
transformation allows us to focus on formal employment. We show in appendix D that
all the results in the paper are unchanged when we include female chefs d’e´tablissement in
farming in the analysis.
We define labor force participation as the employed share of the population aged 15
or older—the data for labor participation disaggregated by age, or marital status, is not
available at the de´partement level for this period. Table 1 provides the average female labor
participation rates across all 87 de´partements between 1901 and 1936. While many women
entered the labor force after the war, they appear to have withdrawn from the labor market
a few years later. In fact, because of the economic crisis in the 1930s, pre-war levels in female
labor participation were not even recovered at the onset of WWII (Maruani and Meron 2012,
pp. 39-40).12 Consistent with this picture, historians and economists alike have described
the surge in female labor just after the war as a mere “parenthesis” in the progress of female
labor in France (see footnote 7 on page 7). Table 1 further motivates our decision to focus on
female labor participation net of female chefs d’e´tablissement in farming: while the corrected
measure remains stable around 33% between 1901 and 1906, the corrected measure displays
an increase of 6 percentage points between these two censuses. Given that there was no
major shock to the labor market between 1901 and 1906, this change can be attributed to
the described measurement error. After 1906, the two measures have a constant difference
of about 20 percentage point, suggesting that the corrected measure does not introduce any
significant bias.
were transcribed from original paper sources.
10Chefs d’e´tablissement can be roughly translated by “boss”.
11Analogous procedures have been used by historians of female labor during this time period (see, e.g.,
Daric 1947, Maruani and Meron 2012).
12Appendix table A.2 provides summary statistics for various labor outcomes for each census year separately,
including the share of the population of each gender working in each sector. It shows that trends in female
labor participation mirrored trends in male labor participation, suggesting that labor market conditions
for both genders were driven by common national trends.
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Table 1.
Female Labor Participation, Means Across 87 De´partements (1901-1936)
1901 1906 1911 1921 1926 1931 1936
FLP (corrected) 32.9 32.7 31.4 35.0 29.9 30.1 28.1
FLP (uncorrected) 45.0 51.9 51.5 55.7 49.6 49.4 47.0
Difference (percentage points) 12.0 19.3 20.1 20.7 19.7 19.3 18.9
Table 1 notes: Means across all 87 de´partements, excluding Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and
Moselle (no data before the war). FLP stands for female labor participation in per-
cents. corrected denotes female labor participation net of female chefs d’e´tablissement
in farming. See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions.
B. Measuring Military Death Rates at the De´partement Level
We assembled a novel dataset to build a precise measure of military death rate at the
de´partement level. To that end, we collected individual level data from an archive maintained
by the French Ministry of Defense.13 This archive contains the scans of individual military
records for virtually all 1.3 million French soldiers who died during the war.14 For each of
these 1.3 million deceased soldier, we record first name, last name, date of birth, and place
of birth.
This dataset allows us to build a measure of military death rates at the de´partement
level. We define the military death rate in a de´partement as as the ratio of the number
of deceased soldiers born in the de´partement to the size of the drafted population in that
de´partement. We approximate the size of the drafted population by the male population
aged 15 to 44 that was living in the de´partement in 1911, the last census before the war.
This approximation is reasonable because, at the onset of the war, the organization of the
army relied on an egalitarian and universal conscription system for all French citizens aged
20 to 48. While it was not until 1905 that the universal conscription system was adopted,
it applied retroactively to all French citizens.15 Using the male population aged 15 to 44 in
13The original archive, called Me´moire des Hommes (MDH), is accessible at http://www.
memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr. See appendix J for more details on this database.
14The exact number of soldiers who ultimately died as a consequence of the war is not known with certainty as
some soldiers died a few years after the war because of injuries or illnesses contracted during the conflict.
However, the figure of 1.3 million is the consensus among historians for the number of military deaths
in November 1918, at the end of the war. Prost (2008) provides a detailed account of the assessment of
military fatalities. It is similarly difficult to assess the number of civilian victims during the conflict. When
we add up the number of pension requests resulting from civilian fatalities, the number of victims during
the bombing of cities near the front (Dunkerque, Calais, Be´thunes, Arras, Lens, Reims, Pont-a`-Mousson,
and Nancy) and Paris, as well as the civilian victims of the commercial fleet, they amount to about 40,000
(Huber 1931, pp. 310-314)
15See the Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 35 (81), pp. 1869-1890, dated March
9
1911 therefore captures the pool of drafted men.
In figure 3, we map the distribution of military death rates across all 87 de´partements.
The data are missing for the three de´partements that belonged to Germany in 1911.16 The
shaded de´partements in the North-East of France experienced war destructions as combats
occurred on their soil. In appendix E, we use historic data on war destructions to show
that these de´partements are not affecting the results. Military death rates range from 6% in
Belfort to 29% in Loze`re, with an average of 14% and a standard deviation of 4%. Throughout
the paper, we use the following metric to interpret regression results: we compare differences
in outcomes across de´partements that experienced a low level of military death rate (10%)
and de´partements that experienced a high level of military death rate (20%). This roughly
corresponds to switching from a median de´partement in the “low” group (25th percentile)
to a median de´partement in the “high” group (75th percentile).17
No data
War dep
6% - 13%
14% - 16%
17%
18% - 19%
20% - 22%
23% - 29%
Figure 3. Military Death Rates Across 87 De´partements
Our empirical results are unaffected by various measurement inaccuracies. First, we
determine the number of military fatalities in a de´partement by using soldiers’ de´partements
23rd, 1905. Appendix table A.1 provides details about the length of military service for each successive
military law until WWI.
16These de´partements are Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and Moselle. We exclude these de´partements throughout
the analysis.
17This metric is similar to the one used in Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 135).
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of birth. This measurement is imperfect because a soldier’s de´partement of birth may differ
from his de´partement of residence, and internal migration flows were not negligible in France
at the beginning of the twentieth century—according to the 1911 census, about 19% of men
aged 15 to 44 were residing outside of their de´partement of birth in 1911. Ideally, we would
assign a deceased soldier to the de´partement in which he was recruited because it is most
likely his de´partement of residence. Unfortunately, this information is not available for most
soldiers. Nevertheless, Guillot and Parent (2015, p. 6) collected the full military records of a
sample of about 18,000 deceased soldiers, and found that about 18% of them were recruited
outside their de´partement of birth. This could be problematic if internal migration flows were
correlated with trends in female labor participation. In appendix F, we explore in detail the
robustness of our results to migration flows by using information on bilateral movements
of the male population between de´partements in 1911. This information allows us to build
a measure of military death rate that takes into account pre-war migration flows of men.
Reassuringly, the results obtained using this corrected measure are similar in magnitude
and precision to the ones obtained using our standard measure. A second potential concern
regards the measure for the pool of drafted men. We implicitly assume that all men subject
to the conscription during the war were actually recruited by the army, or, equivalently,
that the recruitment rate was equal across de´partements. This need not be the case as
some men were exempted from the conscription due to poor health conditions: indeed, only
78.5% of all men subject to the conscription were recruited by the army at the onset of the
war (Huber 1931, p. 93). However, the enlistment rate increased as the military casualties
accumulated throughout the conflict: many men that were previously deemed “unfit” were
eventually recalled into the armed forces. For instance, 92% of the cohort aged 20 in 1914
was eventually recruited (Boulanger 2001, pp. 118-128). Using military recruitment data
by cohort together with various health measures, we show in appendix G that the potential
concern of differential pre-war health conditions across de´partements does not affect our
results. Another potential concern may be that some men aged under 20 or over 48 had the
opportunity to voluntarily enlist in the army. These were relatively rare cases. For instance,
while about 26,000 men out of 188,000 conscripts voluntarily enlisted in the army in 1914,
they were only 11,000 out of 211,000 to do so in 1915 (Boulanger 2001, pp. 128-136).
To illustrate how much military death rates impacted adult sex ratios, we estimate the
following first-difference regressions:
∆sex ratioa,d = α + β death rated + εa,d. (1)
∆sex ratioa,d denotes the change in sex ratio between 1911 and 1921 for age group a in
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de´partement d, and death rated denotes the military death rate in de´partement d. Table 2
reports the results. Because drafted men were between 20 and 48 during the war, we expect
the age groups between 25 and 49 in 1921 to experience the strongest decrease in sex ratio.
This is indeed what we find: for instance, a 10 percentage point increase in military death
rate was associated with a decrease of almost 7 percentage points of the sex ratio for the age
group 30 to 34 in 1921. As a result, the sex ratio among this age group dropped on average
from 100 in 1911 to 82 in 1921.
Table 2.
Military Death Rates and Changes in Sex Ratios (1911-1921)
Age group: 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54
Death rate 0.61 -0.46** -0.58*** -0.37*** -0.32** -0.09 0.00
[0.95] [0.19] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.12]
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.006 0.061 0.170 0.089 0.101 0.008 0.000
Mean sex ratio in 1911 107 99 107 100 100 99 99
Mean sex ratio in 1921 86 80 86 82 84 91 96
Table 2 notes: Results from estimating equation 1. The dependent variable is the change in
the sex ratio between 1911 and 1921 for a given age group. Sex ratios are defined as the ratio
of the male population to the female population. See appendix K for details about variable
sources and definitions. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at
the 10 percent level.
C. Sources of Variation of Military Death Rates
In this section, we explore the sources of variation in military death rates across de´partements.
We show that military death rates were not randomly distributed but instead determined by
the geographical organization of the army at the beginning of the war, and by various demo-
graphic and economic characteristics. Overall, more rural de´partements suffered relatively
more military fatalities. This correlation was for the most part generated by the policies
implemented by the Ministe`re de la Guerre (Ministry of War) to draw industrial workers
from the battlefield into war factories in order to sustain the industrial war effort. Neverthe-
less, we show that the distribution of military death rates was not correlated with pre-war
trends in female labor participation, giving us confidence in the validity on the identifying
assumption of the difference-in-differences strategy.
Geography of the Organization of the Army in 1914. The first source of variation in
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military death rates across de´partements stems from the geography of the organization of
the army. In 1914, the army was organized in 21 military regions and 2 specific bureaus for
Paris and Lyon.18 Both the recruitment of soldiers and the constitution of military units
were based on these military regions: at the beginning of the war, soldiers were assigned to
military units that were constituted by soldiers from the same military region. As a result,
soldiers from the same military region were initially sent to the same battle fields according
to a plan of mobilization designed in 1912, the Plan XVII (Joffre 1932). This plan assigned
each military unit to a battle front in the case of an attack by German troops. Gonzalez-Feliu
and Parent (2016) show that the allocation logic of the troops at the beginning of the war
was the outcome of an optimization problem in which the objective of the military command
was to minimize the travel time of the troops between their military region of origin and the
front, with the railroad network as the main constraint.19 However, as military casualties
accumulated, the military command changed its affectation policy: after only 5 months into
the war, soldiers were allocated to any military unit based on each unit’s needs in soldiers.
Thereby, troops from different military regions were increasingly mixed together starting
January 1915.20
This military organization has two consequences regarding variations in military death
rates across de´partements. First, de´partements that did not belong to the same military re-
gion had relatively different death rates because their troops were assigned to different battle
fields at the beginning of the war, with presumably different levels of casualties. Second,
de´partements belonging to the same military region could have had similar death rates for
the same reason. The latter might reduce the extent of the variation in military death rates
across de´partements that were within the same military region. However, the correlation
of death rates across de´partements of to the same military region is small (0.12), mostly
because soldiers from different military regions were mixed into the same military units soon
after the beginning of the war.21
Demographic and Economic Factors. We now explore how various de´partements’ eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics before the war help explain variations in military
18The basis of this system was given by the law of the general organization of the army of July 24th, 1873.
The geography of the army was then only marginally readjusted until WWI. The exact geography that
prevailed in August 1914 was fixed by the law of December 22nd, 1913 (Boulanger 2001, pp. 16-24).
See the Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 45 (349), pp. 11009-11010, dated
December 24th, 1913.
19See Joffre (1932) and Le He´naff (1922) for a historical account of the preparation and application of the
transportation plan of the troops along the lines of the Plan XVII.
20This change in affectation policy was allowed by the circulaire of December 6th, 1913, in the case of war
time (Boulanger 2001, p. 253).
21The composition of each military region is from Boulanger (2001, pp. 335-337).
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death rates across de´partements.22 First, we divide de´partements into three groups of 29
de´partements with low, medium, and high levels of military death rates. Then, we regress
various pre-war characteristics on group membership indicators—the low group is the ex-
cluded category.23 We report the results in Table 3. Column 1 reports the means of pre-war
characteristics across all 87 de´partements. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients on the
medium and high group membership indicators. By construction, these represent the dif-
ference between the relevant group mean and the low group mean. Column 4 reports the
difference in means between the high and the medium group.
A clear pattern emerges: more rural de´partements experienced more military fatalities.
The rurality of a de´partement can be captured by two characteristics: the share of rural
population (the share of population that resides in cities smaller than 2,000 inhabitants, as
defined by the censuses), and the share of the residing population born in the de´partement.24,25
Finally, de´partements that suffered higher military death rates had lower female labor par-
ticipation before the war. All these differences in levels across de´partements will not affect
identification because they will be absorbed by the de´partement fixed effects in the estima-
tion.
To explore this pattern in more details, we regress military death rates on various pre-war
characteristics. Some selected estimates are reported in table 4. The full set of estimates
is shown in appendix table A.3. As expected, de´partements that suffered more military
fatalities had lower female labor participation before the war (table 4, column 1). Moreover,
more rural de´partements suffered more military fatalities (columns 2 and 3). The share of
rural population and the share of the residing population born in the de´partement explain
most of the variation in military death rates across de´partements, as each explains over 60%
its variance. When including all variables, only these two characteristics show statistical
significance (column 4). Finally, the corresponding coefficients barely change, either when
including (column 5) or excluding (column 6) female labor participation from the regression.
Finally, we include 20 region fixed effects to effectively compare neighboring de´partements
(column 7). Again, the results are similar. The share of rural population together with
22 See appendix K for all the variable sources and definitions.
23More precisely, we estimate the following specification: Xd,1911 = α+ βm mediumd + βh highd + εd, where
Xd,1911 corresponds to characteristic X de´partement d in 1911, mediumd is an indicator for de´partement d
being in the medium group of military death rate, and highd an indicator for de´partement d being in the
high group of military death rate. The low death rate group is the excluded category.
24The average personal wealth, the share of active population working in agriculture, or the share of cultivated
land also capture some aspects of rurality, but all the variation in these variables across de´partements is
captured by the share of rural population and the share of the residing population born in the de´partement.
25While a higher share of the residing population born in the de´partement may mean either more immigration
or more emigration, the later is the case. See Tugault (1970, 1973) and Ogden and White (2002, chapter
2) for more details on internal migrations in France in the early twentieth century.
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Table 3.
Pre-War De´partement Characteristics by Level of Military Death Rate
Relative to low Difference
Military death rate: All Medium High (3) - (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Death rate (%) 15.6 4.2*** 7.7*** 3.4***
(3.8) [0.5] [0.7] [0.5]
FLP (%) 31.4 -1.9 8.8*** -5.0**
(8.9) [2.3] [2.2] [2.2]
Demographic factors
Population (thousands) 450 -293** -334** -41
(468) [142] [142] [36]
Population density (per km2) 166 -335 -343 -7
(908) [291] [291] [5]
Share rural population (%) 66.9 21.5*** 30.2*** 8.8***
(17.7) [3.8] [3.8] [1.7]
Share born in de´partement (%) 79.8 11.4*** 17.2*** 5.8***
(11.6) [2.8] [2.8] [1.4]
Age 32.4 0.5 -0.4 -0.9*
(2.0) [0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
Height (cm) 166.2 -0.30 -1.13*** -0.83***
(1.2) [0.26] [0.29] [0.29]
Economic factors
Share in industry (%) 31.5 -10.5*** -17.1*** -6.6***
(11.2) [2.7] [2.5] [1.7]
Share in agriculture (%) 48.8 16.6*** 26.9*** 10.3***
(15.5) [3.3] [3.1] [1.9]
Road density (km per km2) 1,283 -102 -193** -91
(342) [94] [89] [81]
Rail density (km per km2) 1.5 -1.1 -1.3* -0.2**
(2.3) [0.7] [0.7] [0.1]
Share cultivated land (%) 44.3 3.7 1.3 -2.4
(17.0) [4.4] [4.7] [4.4]
Personal wealth (Francs per inhabitant) 3,639 -1,006 -2,235*** -1,229***
(2,384) [652] [648] [424]
Banking deposits (Francs per inhabitant) 12.7 -2.5 -2.1 0.4
(5.8) [1.7] [1.7] [1.1]
Direct taxes (Francs per inhabitant) 23.7 -4.6** -9.9*** -5.3***
(8.1) [1.9] [1.9] [1.8]
Share read and write (%) 84.7 -1.8 -7.2*** -5.4**
(7.7) [1.7] [1.8] [2.1]
Share primary education (%) 61.1 1.6 -9.0** -10.7***
(14.6) [3.3] [3.7] [4.0]
Other factors
Distance to war (km) 322 30 106** 76
(205) [60] [53] [46]
Share students in religious schools (%) 3.0 -0.8 0.2 1.0
(3.4) [0.7] [1.0] [1.0]
Vote in 1905 (%) 61.4 -5.9 -2.6 3.3
(32.5) [8.9] [7.9] [9.0]
Turnout in 1914 (%) 76.9 0.4 -0.0 -0.4
(5.6) [1.3] [1.6] [1.5]
Figure 3 notes: Column 1 reports mean values for all 87 de´partements. Standard deviations
are reported in parenthesis. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients from regressing pre-war
characteristics on indicators for being a medium (β̂m) and a high (β̂h) death rate de´partement,
following the specification in footnote 23. Column 4 shows the difference between estimates in
columns 3 and 2. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Each group contains 29 de´partements.
See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
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the share of the residing population born in the de´partement explain about 75% of the
variation in military death rates across de´partements. We will use these two variables as the
time-varying control variables in the analysis.
Table 4.
OLS Estimates of Military Death Rates on Pre-War Characteristics
Dependent variable: Military death rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FLP -0.15*** -0.06 0.03
[0.05] [0.07] [0.03]
Rural 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Born in de´p. 0.26*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.18***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Demographic factors No No No Yes No No No
Economic factors No No No Yes No No No
Other factors No No No Yes No No No
Region FE No No No No No No Yes
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.130 0.690 0.629 0.839 0.748 0.745 0.825
Figure 4 notes: The dependent variable is military death rate. FLP is the female labor partici-
pation in percents. Rural is the share of rural population in percents. Born in de´p is the share
of the residing population born in the de´partement in percents. Demographic, Economic, and
Other factors are those factors in table 3. See appendix K for details about variable sources and
definitions. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10
percent level.
There are two main reasons for the strong correlation between military death rates and
rurality. First, as the war lasted longer than anticipated, the military command realized
that its plan for supplying weapons and machinery to the troops was highly insufficient
(Porte 2005, pp. 73-82). For instance, the plan of military mobilization did not plan any
production of new military equipment, providing only 50,000 workers allocated across thirty
war factories (Porte 2006, p. 26). In fact, it was not until January 1917 that a proper ministry
of armament was even created.26 To cope with the ongoing war effort in conjunction with
the lack of available civilian labor and the German occupation of the North-East industrial
de´partements, the Ministe`re de la Guerre issued a law in August 1915—one year after the
beginning of the war—to withdraw soldiers with manufacturing skills from the front lines,
26The Ministe`re de l’Armement was created by the decree of December 31st, 1916 (Journal Officiel de la
Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 49 (1), pp. 18-19, dated January 1st, 1917).
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and allocate them to war factories.27 In this effort, priority was given to older soldiers and
fathers of large families. As a result, up to 560,000 soldiers who should have been on the front
lines were working in war factories during the conflict.28 Furthermore, in 1916, the military
also started to allocate some of its soldiers into mines to increase steel production. Thus,
soldiers from more industrial places, or, equivalently, from less rural ones, had a lower chance
of dying in combats.29 Second, compared to the urban population, the rural population was
less educated, and thus lacked the skills to be hired by various military administrations
operating far from the battle zones. As a result, administrative jobs were mostly given to
soldiers from urban areas (Ridel 2007).
Note that military death rates and migration patterns are also correlated as captured by
the share of the residing population born in the de´partement. To explore this in more details,
we build a more direct measure of migration flows at the de´partement level by computing
the share of the population that is “in excess” in 1911 based on the yearly flows of births
and deaths since 1901.30 When regressing military death rates on this measure, we find that
de´partements that experienced more migration outflows suffered more military fatalities.
Moreover, the share of the residing population born in the de´partement is a strong predictor
of these migration outflows: regressing the population in excess on the share of the residing
population born in the de´partement yields a coefficient of -0.36, with a standard error of 0.04,
and an R2 of 79%. This confirms our interpretation that emigration de´partements—those
undergoing some rural exodus—suffered more military fatalities.
Overall, the relationship between military death rates and measures of rurality can be
thought of as the result of the policies implemented by the Ministe`re de la Guerre to sustain
the industrial war effort. We interpret the residual variation in military death rates as
non-systematic, and related to the randomness at which soldiers encountered violence on
the battlefield. Many war novels describe this phenomenon. Among others, Erich Maria
27The law Dalbiez of August 17th, 1915, stipulates the following. “The Ministry of War is authorized to
allocate to corporations, factories, and mines working for the national defense men belonging to a mobilized
or mobilizable age class, industrial managers, engineers, production managers, foremen, workers, and who
will justify to have practiced their job for at least a year in those corporations, firms and mines, or in
comparable corporations, firms, and mines” (art. 6, Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et
De´crets, 47 (223), pp. 5785-5787, dated August 19th, 1915).
28We provide a detailed account of the number of mobilized soldiers outside of armed services throughout
the war in appendix table A.4.
29Note that the lower death rate in industrial de´partements induced by the Law Dalbiez was mitigated by
the mobilization of soldiers into harvesting from 1917, as labor shortage in the countryside posed a threat
to the harvest. This was authorized by the law Mourier of February 20th, 1917 (Journal Officiel de la
Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 49 (51), p. 1408, dated February 21st, 1917).
30More precisely, the share of population in excess in de´partement d in 1911 is calculated as[
populationd,1911 −
(
populationd,1901 +
∑1911
t=1901 birthsd,t −
∑1911
t=1901 deathsd,t
)]
/populationd,1911 ×
100.
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Remarque writes: “It is by chance that I remain alive, just as it is by change that I can be
hit. In the bombproof shelter, I can be torn to pieces, while in the open under ten hours of
the most violent bombardments, I may not receive a scratch” (Remarque 1929).31
As we mentioned earlier, the correlations between pre-war characteristics and military
death rates need not threaten the identification as long as the distribution of military death
rates is not correlated with trends in female labor participation. By regressing military death
rates on changes in female labor participation before the war, we find that de´partements
that suffered higher military death rates were experiencing a slight relative decline in female
labor participation before the war (columns 1 and 4 of table 5). However, these coeffi-
cients are not significant, and would bias the results downward. As described earlier, those
de´partements were subject to a rural exodus. As men and women alike were migrating to
urban de´partements, the labor structure of these de´partements was slowly changing as well:
the size of the industrial sector—and thus formal labor markets—was slowly decreasing. This
can explain the relative decline in female labor participation in those areas. When we control
for changes in the share of rural population and changes in migration flows, the correlation
between pre-war trends in female labor participation and military death rate becomes even
weaker (columns 3 and 6). Hence, these slight pre-war differential trends in female labor
participation do not invalidate the identification. We later substantiate this claim with a
battery of tests to relax the parallel trend assumption.
IV. The Missing Men and Female Labor Participation
A. Baseline Difference-in-Differences Estimates
We first compare relative changes in female labor participation across de´partements that
suffered varying levels of military death rates. To better illustrate how military death rates
and changes in female labor participation relate, table 6 compares average labor participation
rates in 1911 and 1921 across de´partements with low, medium and high military death rates.
De´partements that suffered higher military death rates experienced a larger increase in female
labor participation between 1911 and 1921: while female labor participation increased by 5%
in de´partements that suffered low levels military rates, it increased by 21% in de´partements
that suffered high levels of military death rates. Male labor participation remained stable
during this time period.
To make these relative changes more apparent, figure 4 displays the relative trends in
female labor participation across the three groups of de´partements between 1901 and 1936.32
31Cited in Guillot and Parent (2015, p. 2).
32For the purpose of this picture, we determine group assignment based on the residuals of the regressions
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Table 5.
OLS Estimates of Military Death Rates on Pre-War Trends
Dependent variable: Military death rate
Panel A. 1901-1911 Panel B. 1906-1911
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in FLP -0.27 -0.20 -0.36 -0.32
[0.17] [0.14] [0.30] [0.27]
Change in Rural 0.43** 0.41** 0.61*** 0.59***
[0.19] [0.19] [0.22] [0.22]
Change in Born in de´p. 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.92*** 0.92***
[0.20] [0.21] [0.22] [0.21]
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.025 0.201 0.214 0.014 0.203 0.213
Figure 5 notes: The dependent variable is military death rate. All the variables
are first-differenced between 1911 and 1901 (columns 1-3) or between 1911 and 1906
(columns 4-6). FLP is the female labor participation in percents. Rural is the share
of rural population in percents. Born in de´p is the share of the residing population
born in the de´partement in percents. See appendix K for details about variable
sources and definitions. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6.
Average Labor Participation Rates by Level of Military Death Rate (1911-1921)
1911 1921 % Change (1911-1921)
All Low Medium High All Low Medium High All Low Medium High
FLP 31.4 34.3 32.4 27.4 35.0 35.2 37.0 32.8 13.9 4.6 15.8 21.3
(8.9) (8.7) (8.6) (8.3) (8.3) (7.7) (8.2) (8.8) (16.2) (15.6) (12.1) (16.5)
MLP 93.2 92.2 94.0 93.4 93.6 92.4 94.4 94.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.8
(2.9) (2.5) (1.7) (3.9) (3.6) (4.2) (2.0) (4.0) (2.3) (3.6) (1.1) (1.2)
Table 6 notes: FLP is female labor participation in percents. MLP is male labor participation in percents.
Low death rates de´partements (29 de´partements) have an average death rate of 11.6%; the medium group (29
de´partements) has an average death rate of 15.8%; the high group (29 de´partements) has an average death
rate of 19.3%. See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions. Standard deviations are in
parenthesis.
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We normalized the levels of female labor participation to 100 in 1911. Figure 4 shows that
de´partements that suffered higher military death rates experienced a larger increase in female
labor participation after the war. Moreover, this gap in female labor participation persisted
throughout the interwar period. Importantly, figure 4 confirms that there were no clear
differential trends in female labor participation across de´partements with varying military
death rates in the pre-war period, although de´partements with higher military death rates
were experiencing a slight relative decline in female labor participation.
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Figure 4. Trends in Female Labor Participation (1901-1936)
Figure 4 notes: Each line corresponds to a group of 29 de´partements with a given level of military death
rate (high, medium, or low). Female labor participation (FLP) is normalized to 100 in 1911.
To analyze the effect of military fatalities more rigorously, we use a difference-in-differences
strategy. Identification stems from relative changes in female labor participation across
de´partements with varying levels of death rates. We estimate the following specification:
FLPd,t = β death rated × postt + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t, (2)
where FLPd,t is female labor participation in de´partement d in year t, death rated is the
military death rate in de´partement d during the war, postt is an indicator variable equal to
1 if t > 1918, γd are de´partement fixed effects, and δt are time fixed effects. Moreover, Xd,t is
of military death rates on pre-war changes in the share of rural population and the share of the residing
population born in the de´partement.
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a vector containing the two time-varying characteristics that we described earlier: the share
of rural population and the share of the residing population born in the de´partement.
The de´partement fixed effects, γd, allow to control for de´partement-specific unobservable
characteristics that are fixed over time and may generate systematic differences in levels
of female labor participation. For instance, some de´partements may have more traditional
views regarding gender roles than others, and therefore display systematically lower female
labor participation rates. The time fixed effects, δt, allow to control for aggregate-level
shocks to the labor market that are common to all de´partements. For instance, labor market
conditions were heavily impacted by the economic crisis between 1926 and 1936 (Maruani
and Meron 2012). Our results are robust to controlling for regional-level shocks instead
(see appendix table A.5, which controls for year times region fixed effects for France’s 21
regions). We include changes in rurality and in migration flows as covariates because they
may be correlated with changes in female labor participation.33
We report the baseline results in panel A of table 7. These imply that in de´partements
that suffered a military death rate of 20% rather than 10%, female labor participation was
3.7 percentage points higher in the interwar period, compared to an average of 31.4% in 1911
(column 1). This corresponds to an increase of nearly 12% in female labor participation.
Put differently, losing 10 men during the conflict induced on average about 2 women to enter
the labor market.34 Controlling for changes in the share of rural population and the share
of the residing population born in the de´partement barely affects the results (columns 2-4).
Also, we find military fatalities had no effects on male labor participation in the post-war
period (panel B).
Effective Sample. To better understand the extent to which each de´partement contributes
to the difference-in-differences estimates, we apply Aronow and Samii’s (2016) procedure to
uncover the “effective sample” used in the regression. This procedure generates regression
weights by computing the relative size of the residual variance of the treatment variable for
each unit in the sample. We find that all de´partements contribute to construct the esti-
mates. Importantly, the relative weight of each de´partement is uncorrelated with its death
rate as well as its pre-war characteristics: low and high death rate de´partements, rural and
33Many of the other covariates that are available for this time period are likely to be directly affected
by military fatalities, such as changes the local structure of the labor market or changes in population
levels. As a result, we cannot include them as controls in the regression because they would confound the
post-treatment relationship between military fatalities and female labor participation.
34For each de´partement, we compute two quantities. First, we compute the number of military fatalities
corresponding to a one percentage point in death rate. Second, we compute the number of working women
corresponding to a 0.37 percentage point increase in female labor participation rate. Then, we use a
product rule, and average the results across de´partements.
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Table 7.
Baseline OLS Estimates (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Panel A. FLP Panel B. MLP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Death rate × post 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
[0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07] [0.09] [0.07]
Rural No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Born in de´p. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.949 0.886 0.896 0.892 0.898
1911 mean 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 93.2 93.2 93.2 93.2
Table 7 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation (FLP) in columns 1-4 of
panel A, and male labor participation (MLP) in columns 5-8 of panel B. Data for the following
census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural is the share of rural population
in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing population born in the de´partement in
percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions. Standard errors are
in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10
percent level.
less rural ones, all equally contribute to the estimates. Note, however, that de´partements
that experienced less migration flows during this period have a slightly larger weight in the
regression. Appendix C provides more details.
Year-Specific Difference-in-Differences Estimates. We now relax the assumption that the
effect of military fatalities was constant across time by estimating year-specific difference-
in-differences coefficients. We include leads and lags to assess the plausibility of the parallel
trends assumption. We estimate the following specification:
FLPd,t =
1936∑
t=1901
t6=1911
βt death rated × yeart + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t, (3)
where we exclude the year 1911, and where yeart is an indicator variable for each year
between 1901 and 1936. The results are shown in panel A of table 8. The estimates are
stable throughout the interwar period as they range between 0.38 and 0.44 (column 1). To
provide a visual impression of their stability throughout the period, we plot the year-specific
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estimates in figure 5. Again, adding the control variables barely changes the estimates
(columns 2-4). These results suggest that military fatalities induced some women to enter
the labor market after the war, and that these women remained in the labor force. Finally,
we also find that military fatalities had no effect on male labor participation (panel B).
Table 8.
Year-Specific OLS Estimates (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Panel A. FLP Panel B. MLP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Death rate × 1901 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
Death rate × 1906 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Death rate × 1921 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Death rate × 1926 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
[0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.12] [0.09] [0.11] [0.08]
Death rate × 1931 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.11
[0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.14] [0.11] [0.12] [0.10]
Death rate × 1936 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.09
[0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13] [0.10] [0.13] [0.10]
Rural No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Born in de´p. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.888 0.899 0.895 0.902
Table 8 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation (FLP) in columns 1-4 of
panel A, and male labor participation (MLP) in columns 5-8 of panel B. Data for the following
census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural is the share of rural population
in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing population born in the de´partement in
percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions. Standard errors are
in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10
percent level.
Importantly, the coefficients on pre-war years are not significant, suggesting that differ-
ential trends in pre-war female labor participation are not driving the results. They are
nonetheless slightly positive: for instance, the baseline coefficient on the lead of 1906 is 0.04
(column 1), with a standard error of the same magnitude. This implies that de´partements
that suffered higher death rates had a relative downward trend in female labor participation
before the war, which could bias the baseline estimates downward. Based on the results in
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the previous section, we interpret this potential downward bias as a result of the correlation
between unobservable determinants of migration patterns and pre-war trends in female labor
participation.
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Figure 5. Year-Specific OLS Estimates (1901-1936)
Figure 5 notes: The dots correspond to the year-specific estimates of column 4 in table 8. The blue lines
represent 95% confidence intervals around the estimates.
B. Robustness Checks
We propose four solutions to mitigate this potential estimation bias. First, we verify
that differential trends in female labor participation across de´partements are not affecting
the results by controlling for de´partement-specific time trends. Second, we relax the parallel
trends assumption by allowing for time-varying heterogeneity across groups of de´partements.
By using Bonhomme and Manresa’s (2015) grouped fixed effects algorithm, we do not impose
any a priori structure on the group assignment. Third, we use some exogenous variations
in military death rates across de´partements as an instrument along with the difference-in-
differences strategy. Finally, we run the analysis separately on groups with similar pre-war
observable characteristics. All the results are similar to the baseline estimates, suggesting
that the parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this context.
Controlling for De´partement-Specific Time Trends. We extend the baseline specification
in equation 2 and control for de´partement-specific time trends in female labor participation.
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We first impose linear time trends and estimate the following specification:
FLPd,t = β death rated × postt + λd · t+ θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t, (4)
where λd · t is the de´partement-specific linear time trend. The results are presented in table
9. All the coefficients are significant at the 5% level. Moreover, they are only slightly larger
than the baseline estimates presented in table 8: the coefficients from this specification imply
that in de´partements that suffered a military death rate of 20% rather than 10%, female labor
participation was 4.0 percentage points higher in the interwar period (table 9, column 4).
This suggests that differential pre-war trends in female labor participation slightly biased
the baseline estimates downward. Adding quadratic, cubic, or quartic time trends does not
change the results (see appendix table A.6).
Table 9.
OLS Estimates with De´partement-Specific Linear Time Trends (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Panel A. FLP Panel B. MLP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Death rate × post 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.40** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Rural No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Born in de´p. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971
1911 mean 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 93.2 93.2 93.2 93.2
Table 9 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation (FLP) in columns 1-4
of panel A, and male labor participation (MLP) in columns 5-8 of panel B. Data for the
following census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural is the share of
rural population in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing population born in the
de´partement in percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions.
Standard errors are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at
the 10 percent level.
Furthermore, we relax the assumption that military fatalities had a constant effect across
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time and compute year-specific coefficients by estimating the following specification:
FLPd,t =
1936∑
τ=1921
βτ death rated × yearτ + λd · t+ θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t, (5)
where we exclude 1901, 1906 and 1911 to estimate the trends. We report the results in
appendix table A.7. As before, the coefficients are stable across time and significant at the
1% level. Again, the estimates are only slightly larger than the baseline estimates presented
in table 8.
Grouped Fixed Effects. It is possible that some de´partements displayed differential time
patterns in female labor participation and biased the baseline estimates downward. To
alleviate this concern, we inspect the robustness of the baseline specification to allowing
for time-varying heterogeneity across groups of de´partements. More specifically, we relax
the assumption that time fixed effects are common to all de´partements by estimating the
following specification:
FLPd,t = β death rated × postt + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δgd,t + εd,t, (6)
where gd represents de´partement d’s group membership, and δgd,t denotes the group specific
time effects. Importantly, we do not impose any a priori structure on group membership such
as geographic clustering. Instead, we estimate group membership from the data by using
Bonhomme and Manresa’s (2015) grouped fixed effects algorithm. Conditional on specifying
the total number of groups, the algorithm optimally groups de´partements with the most
similar time profiles in female labor participation, net of the correlation with military death
rates and other covariates. By controlling for differential time patterns in female labor
participation across groups, we can effectively relax the parallel trends assumption.
To illustrate this point more clearly, we set the number of groups to 5 and plot the
grouped fixed effects δ̂gdt in panel (a) of figure 6. All five groups have parallel time patterns,
suggesting that using a single time fixed effect is justified. Moreover, they do not display
any differential time pattern in female labor participation rates when the effect of military
fatalities and de´partements characteristics are accounted for (see panel (b) of figure 6). This
suggests that the parallel trends assumption across all de´partements is reasonable in this
context. Appendix figure B.1 shows the estimate β̂ of equation 6 for up to 10 groups. Al-
lowing for heterogeneity in the time pattern of female labor participation does not alter the
baseline results much with all coefficients close to 0.3.
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Figure 6. Patterns of Grouped Heterogeneity
Figure 6 notes: The estimation of the grouped fixed effects δ̂gdt in panel (a) and trends in female labor
participation in panel (b) follow Bonhomme and Manresa’s (2015) grouped fixed effects algorithm.
Instrumental Variables Strategy. We use exogenous variation in military death rates as
an instrument in a difference-in-differences framework. The instrumental variables strategy
relies on the recruitment process of the army. At the onset of the war, in 1914, the active
army was constituted by four age cohorts: the men between the ages 20 and 23.35 To follow
the vocabulary of the army, we designate an age cohort by the year in which it was recruited
by the army, i.e., the year when members of that cohort reached the age of 20. For instance,
we designate the cohort that was born in 1894 as the class of 1914. In 1914, the active
army was constituted by the classes of 1911 to 1914: while the class of 1914 had just been
recruited, the class of 1911 had just finished its three years of military training, and was
about to be transfered to the reserve of the active army. As a result, men that belonged to
the classes of 1911 to 1914 had a different level of military training when the war begun, but
they were sent to the same battlefields, within the same military units. The class of 1911
had completed three years of military training, the class of 1912 had completed two years,
and the class of 1913 had completed one year. The class of 1914 had only three months
of training. Intuitively, men with more military training should be more efficient on the
battlefield and die at lower rates. This is indeed what we find in the data: the contribution
of each class to military fatalities is monotonically increasing from the class of 1911 to the
35Following the military conscription law of 1913, the army was divided into four armies: the active army,
composed by the age classes currently doing their military service, the reserve of the active army, the
territorial army, and the reserve of the territorial army (see appendix table A.1 for the length of service
in each of those armies).
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class of 1914.36 We argue that these differences are essentially due to differential levels of
military training across the classes of 1911 to 1914.
Other reasons could potentially explain the differential death rate across these four
classes. First, members of each class could have differential initial physical or intellectual
abilities. Appendix table A.8 shows that members of each class had similar heights and edu-
cation levels at age 20, rejecting this possibility.37 A second reason might be that averaging
yields the observed pattern: if older soldiers died at lower rates because of better physical
abilities than younger soldiers, then averaging death rates over an entire class could yield
the pattern observed in the data. To verify that differences in death rates across classes
are not driven by such an averaging effect, figure 7 plots the number of military fatalities
by month of birth across these four classes. It shows that differences in fatalities by class
are not driven by an averaging effect as regression lines do not display a positive slope. In
fact, soldiers born earlier in the year seem to die at higher rates.38 A third reason might
be that older soldiers were more likely to be of higher military rank, and were therefore less
likely to be sent on the battlefield. Indeed, the mechanism of promotion in the army was
partly based on seniority.39 As a result, it is possible that soldiers that entered the army
earlier moved up the ranks faster. This, in turn, could have decreased their probability of
dying on the battlefield: Guillot and Parent (2015) show that higher ranked soldiers had a
longer life expectancy during the war, although the effect is small.40 This last reason does
not invalidate the instrumental variables strategy as it is still the year of birth—either by
increasing the length of training or increasing seniority and thereby the likelihood of faster
promotion—that creates an exogenous discontinuity in the probability of dying during the
war.
The instrumental variables strategy builds on these discontinuities. Ideally, we would
like to compute the relative size of the male population born in December of a given year t
compared to the size of the male population born in January of year t+ 1. According to our
reasoning, men born “by chance” in December should die at lower rates than the men born
36More precisely, the class of 1911 contributed 5.7% to the overall death rate, the class of 1912 contributed
6.2%, the class of 1913 contributed 6.5%, and the class of 1914 contributed 6.7%.
37The data are from the Rapports sur le recrutement de l’arme´e for the years 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913,
and 1914. We also show that those age classes are similar along these dimensions to older age classes.
38This is not driven by cyclical birth patterns, as the same pattern holds when we weight fatalities by the
number of birth in each month.
39The promotion system of the army during WWI followed the principles of the Ordonnance of March 16th,
1838, which required at least 6 month in a given rank to have the opportunity to move up to a higher
rank—this was the case for lower ranks of the army such as soldier of 1st class and corporal (Ordonnance
du 16 mars 1838 sur l’avancement dans l’arme´e, Title II, Chapter I, art. 11, p. 18).
40For instance, conditional on dying during the war, a 1st class soldier lived on average 60 days longer than
a 2nd class soldier. Similarly, a corporal (the rank just above 1st rank soldier) lived on average 91 days
longer than a 2nd class soldier (Guillot and Parent 2015, p. 19).
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Figure 7. Military Fatalities by Month of Birth, Classes 1911 to 1914
Figure 7 notes: Each gray dot represents the number of military fatalities for soldiers born during the same
month of the same year. The blue lines are regression lines for each class.
in January because they got an additional year of training for plausibly exogenous reasons.
However, the census of 1911 only provides information on the male population by year of
birth in each de´partement, not by month of birth. This allows us to build three instruments,
each instrument representing the relative size of a class compared to the following class. For
instance, the relative size of the class of 1913 with respect to the class of 1914 is calculated
as:
ratio class1913-1914,d =
male population of class 1913 in de´partement d
male population of class 1914 in de´partement d
× 100, (7)
with population data from the census of 1911.
We verify in appendix H that the results are not sensitive to alternative specifications
of the instruments: we obtain similar results when using the size of a given class compared
to the size of the male population of all four classes, or when using the size of a given class
compared to the size of the class of 1910.
The set of instrumental variables we use is based on de´partement-specific demographic
characteristics. As a result, the instruments could be systematically correlated with unob-
served determinants of the rural exodus, which are themselves correlated with differential
trends in female labor participation across de´partements. Consider the case of a de´partement
characterized by a strong rural exodus. It may be possible that, as they get older, mean
29
leave their de´partement to find a job in another, more urban, de´partement.41 This would in
turn change labor market conditions for women, for instance by inducing a decline in the size
of the industrial sector. Older cohorts in those de´partements would then be systematically
smaller than younger ones in a given year. In this case, the instruments would not be inde-
pendent of potential outcomes and the exclusion restriction would be violated. We explore
this possibility by first computing the correlation across the three instruments and find co-
efficients of correlation that range from 0.16 to 0.31. This suggests that the determinants of
the relative size of successive cohorts are not systematically correlated. We then explore the
dynamic pattern of the instruments within each de´partement. We find that the instruments
do not follow a deterministic trajectory in 60% of the cases, i.e., consecutive cohorts are
neither systematically decreasing nor increasing in size.42 If the instruments were randomly
assigned, we would not find any systematic pattern in 75% of the cases.43 Finally, we check
in appendix table A.10 that the instruments are not correlated with pre-war trends in fe-
male labor participation. All these tests support the idea that the instruments are unrelated
to unobservable determinants of migration patterns before the war and that the exclusion
restriction is unlikely to be violated.44
We verify that the instruments are correlated with the distribution of military death rates
by estimating the following first-stage specification for each instrument:
death rated × postt = φ ratio classd × postt + κ′ Xd,t + µd + ηt + εd,t. (8)
where µd are de´partement fixed effects, and ηt time fixed effects. The estimates are reported
in table 10. As expected, the higher the size of a class relative to the next one, the lower
the death rate. Moreover, the instruments are relatively strong: the F-statistics are well
above 10 for two out of three instruments (columns 1 and 2). It is about 9 for the third
instrument (column 3), and about 23 when we use all three instruments together (column
4). In addition, figure 8 shows the first-stage estimates for all other class ratios. It shows
that only the instruments we propose yield a credible first-sage. This supports the idea that
the four classes we consider were uniquely affected by differential training levels.
41The largest part of internal migrations in France around that time were micro-migrations within rural
areas (Bourdieu et al. 2000, Kesztenbaum 2014).
42We provide the full patterns in appendix table A.9.
43If instruments were randomly assigned, each instrument would be above one 50% of the time. As a result,
all three instruments being above one would have a probability of one eighth. Therefore, a systematic
pattern of all instruments being above one or all instruments being below one would emerge 25% of the
time.
44A scenario would be that the imbalances in successive cohorts sizes affected the post-war female labor
market conditions through the disruption in the post-war marriage market. It would be the case if females
were only mating with men from their own cohort, which is unlikely.
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Table 10.
First-Stage Estimates
Dependent variable: Death rate × post
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ratio class 1911-1912 × post -0.28*** -0.17***
[0.06] [0.04]
Ratio class 1912-1913 × post -0.39*** -0.31***
[0.06] [0.06]
Ratio class 1913-1914 × post -0.31*** -0.20***
[0.10] [0.05]
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609
De´partements 87 87 87 87
R2 0.962 0.969 0.958 0.976
F-statistic 24.93 47.75 9.10 23.37
Table 10 notes: The dependent variable is military death rates. Data for the
following census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural
is the share of rural population in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of
the residing population born in the de´partement in percents. See appendix
K for details about variable sources and definitions. Standard errors are in
brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
We instrument the death rate in equation 2 with the relative size of consecutive classes.
The main results are reported in table 11. For reference, column 1 displays the baseline
OLS estimate from column 4 in table 7. The coefficient in column 5 suggests that the base-
line OLS estimates were biased downward because of a slight pre-war differential trend in
female labor participation in de´partements with high military death rates. The instrumen-
tal variable results imply that in de´partements that suffered a military death rate of 20%
rather than 10%, female labor participation was 5.4 percentage points higher in the interwar
period. Again, only the class ratios we consider generate meaningful results (see appendix
figure B.2). All these results are robust to alternative specifications of the instruments (see
appendix H).
Analysis on Separate Sub-Groups. Finally, we split the sample in halves along pre-war
observable characteristics. We select the characteristics along which de´partements with vary-
ing levels of military death rates were systematically different (see table 3). We then run the
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Figure 8. First-Stage Estimates, All Class Ratios
Figure 8 notes: Each category is a class ratio as defined in equation 7. For instance, 1890-1891 is the ratio
of the class 1890 to the class 1891. The instruments we use in the analysis are in red. The blue lines indicate
95% intervals around the estimate.
analysis separately on these subsamples, which renders the parallel trends assumption even
more plausible. The results are reported in table 12, where each cell represents the estimate
from a separate regression. Panel A shows the results when using the OLS estimation strat-
egy, and panel B when using the instrumental variables strategy. For reference, the first line
shows the baseline estimates from tables 7 and 11. All estimates have the expected sign and
most of them are significant at conventional levels. The estimates show some heterogeneous
responses to military fatalities across de´partements: in general, female labor participation
responded more to military fatalities in de´partements that were more urban, more industrial,
and wealthier. These results reinforce the idea that we are indeed capturing the effect of
military fatalities on female labor participation in the interwar period. We also decompose
the response of female labor to military fatalities by sector of activity, and find that about
80% of the total effect identified in the baseline results stems from women working in the
industrial sector (see appendix I).
A final concern is related to post-war migration patterns of women seeking employ-
ment. Suppose that wages were higher in de´partements that suffered higher military fatal-
ities—reflecting the relative loss of male labor input. This could increase the relative wage
of female labor that it is substitutable with male labor. If women were mobile, the overall
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Table 11.
Instrumental Variables Estimates (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Female Labor Participation (FLP)
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Death rate × post 0.35*** 0.80*** 0.48*** 0.37* 0.54***
[0.07] [0.24] [0.16] [0.20] [0.14]
Instrument No 1 2 3 1-3
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609 609
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.949 0.948 0.940 0.949 0.947
1911 FLP mean 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4
Table 11 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation.
Data for the following census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931,
and 1936. Rural is the share of rural population in percents. Born in
de´p. is the share of the residing population born in the de´partement in
percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources and defi-
nitions. Instrument 1 is the ratio of the class 1911 to the class 1912;
instrument 2 is the ratio of te class of 1912 to the class of 1913; instru-
ment 3 is the ratio of the class of 1913 to the class of 1914. Column 1
reports the baseline OLS estimates from column 4 in table 7. Standard
errors are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
effect of military fatalities on female labor participation could partially be attributed to some
women leaving low death rate de´partements for high death rate de´partements. Appendix
figure B.3 shows the national trends in female migration patterns. The share of the female
population born in their de´partement of residence was declining throughout the period, but
this trend was not altered by the war, alleviating the concern that mobile labor may con-
found the results. Nevertheless, to address this potential concern, we run specification 2 with
the share of the female population born in their de´partement of residence as the dependent
variable. We find no correlation with military death rates (coefficient of 0.08, and standard
error of 0.11).
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Table 12.
Estimates on Various Subsamples (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Female Labor Participation (FLP)
Panel A. OLS Panel B. IV
Level: Low High Low High
Baseline estimates 0.35*** 0.54***
[0.07] [0.14]
Subsamples
FLP (%) 0.18** 0.37*** 0.31** 0.52***
[0.08] [0.13] [0.12] [0.14]
Population (thousands) 0.19*** 0.51*** 0.28** 0.90***
[0.06] [0.11] [0.10] [0.19]
Share rural population (%) 0.42*** 0.28** 0.51** 0.67**
[0.14] [0.11] [0.23] [0.28]
Share born within de´partement (%) 0.41*** 0.35** 0.51** 0.62*
[0.13] [0.14] [0.25] [0.32]
Age 0.49*** 0.13 0.54*** 0.40*
[0.09] [0.14] [0.10] [0.21]
Height (cm) 0.29*** 0.34** 0.42*** 0.42
[0.07] [0.15] [0.10] [0.26]
Share in industry (%) 0.13* 0.41*** 0.24 0.46*
[0.07] [0.15] [0.17] [0.24]
Share in agriculture (%) 0.33** 0.06 0.32 0.18
[0.13] [0.08] [0.20] [0.21]
Road density (km per km2) 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.45** 0.75***
[0.11] [0.11] [0.18] [0.23]
Rail density (km per km2) 0.12* 0.53*** 0.24*** 0.71***
[0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.18]
Personal wealth (Francs per inhabitant) 0.17*** 0.50*** 0.33** 0.48*
[0.06] [0.15] [0.14] [0.26]
Banking deposits (Francs per inhabitant) 0.32* 0.37*** 0.68*** 0.45***
[0.16] [0.08] [0.25] [0.13]
Direct taxes (Francs per inhabitant) 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.51*
[0.09] [0.15] [0.14] [0.26]
Share read and write (%) 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.39*** 0.64***
[0.10] [0.13] [0.13] [0.15]
Share primary education (%) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.42** 0.66***
[0.10] [0.12] [0.20] [0.16]
Distance to war (km) 0.66*** 0.26*** 0.73*** 0.40***
[0.21] [0.08] [0.17] [0.11]
Table 12 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation. Data for the
following census-years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. De´partements
are split along characteristics levels of 1911. All regressions include Rural and Born in
de´p. as covariates. Each subsample contains 43 or 44 de´partements. See appendix K
for details about variable sources and definitions. The baseline OLS estimate is from
column 4 in table 7, and the baseline IV estimate is from column 5 in table 11. Standard
errors are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant
at the 10 percent level.
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V. Investigating the Mechanisms
We have documented the effect of military fatalities on female labor participation in the
interwar period. We now investigate the mechanisms underlying this effect. Both changes
in supply and demand for female labor could account for the pattern we find in the data.
Military fatalities could have induced women to increase their supply of labor for three
reasons. First, young single women were facing deteriorated marriage prospects after the
war due to the shortage of men, decreasing the expected value of marriage (Abramitzky et
al. 2011). As a result, some women could have preferred to enter the labor market rather
than to marry with a lower quality husband. Alternatively, they could have spent more time
searching for a valuable husband, thereby entering the labor market for a limited period
of time.45,46 Second, the deteriorated marriage market conditions could have decreased the
bargaining position of married women within the household, leaving them with a lower share
of household income (Chiappori et al. 2002, Grossbard 2014). This negative income shock
could in turn have increased their labor supply. Third, some war widows could have entered
the labor force to compensate for the loss of their husbands’ incomes, as subsidies to war
widows were relatively small. For instance, the cumulated amount of subsidies to a war
widow in 1921 amounted only to a quarter of the average labor income of a working woman
(see appendix figure B.4 for a simulation of the real income of single working women, single
mothers, and war widows in the interwar period).47 On the other hand, the scarcity of men
could have induced firms to demand more female labor, especially in sectors where female
labor was a close substitute to male labor.
In this section, we successively explore whether supply and demand factors can explain
the pattern we find in the data. Within the limits of the data available for this time period,
we find that the most plausible channel consists of supply factors: single women entering
the labor force while searching for a husband, and war widows working to compensate for
the loss of their husbands’ incomes. We also show that the rise in female labor participation
during the war cannot explain the post-war entrance of women in the labor force. Finally,
45State subsidies to single mothers were relatively low. As a result, women did not see single motherhood
as a third option, leaving working as a single woman and getting married as marginal choices (Neal 2004).
For instance, an average working women in 1921 earned about seven times as much as a single mother
with two children relying on State subsidies. To support this point, appendix figure B.4 simulates the real
income for single working women, single mothers, and war widows.
46Historical accounts support the idea that the market place was a platform to meet a husband. For instance,
a female factory superintendent tells the following in a survey conducted in factories in 1934: “[...] the
young [female workers] prefer working at the factory then in their homes. Young women consider [the
factory] as an occasion to get married” (Delagrange 1934, p. 39).
47Note that State subsidies to war widows sharply increased at the end of the interwar period: in 1931,
subsidies to war widows increased to about 75% of the labor income of an average working women.
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we show that changes in beliefs about gender roles—measured by changes in voting patterns
of de´pute´s at the Assemble´e Nationale regarding female suffrage extension before and after
the war—cannot account for the rise in female labor participation after the war.48
A. Supply Factors: the Marriage Market and Adverse Income Shocks
To assess the effect of military fatalities on female labor participation through labor sup-
ply channels, we transcribed marital status data from the seven French censuses from 1901
to 1936. Summary statistics for the share of the female population of each marital status
are provided in appendix table A.11. The share of single women sharply increased after the
war, especially among the women aged 20 to 29: while 39% of women of this age group were
single in 1911, 44% of them were single in 1921. The share of widows also sharply increased
after the war, especially among the women aged 30 to 39: while 4% of women within this
age group were widows in 1911, 10% of them were widows in 1921.
Military Fatalities and Marriage Market Outcomes. We first document how military fa-
talities tightened the post-war marriage market, and then identify how this in turn impacted
female labor participation. Using a different, more aggregated, source of data for military
death rates, Abramitzky et al. (2011) show that the war worsened the position of women
on the marriage market as men became more scarce. As a result, women were less likely to
marry after the war in de´partements that suffered relatively more military fatalities.49 We
expect that a significant share of the women who did not marry because of the war entered
the labor force after the war. Moreover, we expect that some women who became widows as
a result of the war also entered the labor force to compensate for the loss of their husbands’
incomes.50
To analyze the impact of military fatalities on the interwar marriage market, we estimate
the following specification for various age groups and marital statuses:51
48The Assemble´e Nationale is the French lower house—France has a bicameral Parliament. The members of
the Assemble´e Nationale are the de´pute´s.
49These findings are based on the theoretical predictions of the seminal work of Gary Becker (1973, 1974,
1981). See Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 127) for a review of the literature.
50A comparable phenomenon has been documented by Salisbury (forthcoming) in the case of widows of the
U.S. Civil War.
51 These regressions extend one of the main results in Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 136). Note that the
marital statuses “widowed” and “divorced” are not available separately in the censuses other than for
1911 and 1921. Moreover, the ages were recorded differently in the 1906 census, so we exclude this year
from the sample. As a result, the sample consists of the following census years: 1901, 1911, 1921, 1926,
1931, and 1936. We reproduce the results presented in Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 136) in appendix table
A.12. Note that we do not exactly reproduce their table because we focus on the marital status of women
only, and we add the share of married women as an outcome variable. Moreover, we use a first-difference
regression instead of a fixed-effects regression, even though the estimates are similar for both specifications
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Ya,d,t = β death rated × postt + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εa,d,t, (9)
where Ya,d,t is the share of the female population of a particular marital status in age
group a, de´partement d, and year t. Again, postt is an indicator variable for t > 1918. We
report the results in table 13. The estimates are very similar to those in Abramitzky et
al. (2011, p. 136), suggesting that their analysis is robust to increasing the sample to the
entire interwar period, and to including more pre-war years. Overall, we find that women in
de´partements that suffered higher military death rates were more often single (panel A) and
widowed (panel B) after the war. In particular, our results imply that in de´partements that
suffered a military death rate of 20% rather than 10%, the proportion of single women aged
20 to 29 was 2.7 percentage points higher, compared to an average of 38.9 in 1911 (column
1).52 The effect is smaller for older women. Moreover, we find that women aged 40 to 49
were most likely to lose their husbands during the war.
Data to explore the labor supply channels in more details are scarce. For instance, the
censuses do not provide information on labor participation by sex and marital status at the
de´partement level. This impedes us from testing the second labor supply channel directly
(increased labor supply by married women). Instead, we rely on information about changes
in the shares of single and widowed women. The results can therefore only be suggestive,
and their credibility will rely upon the validity of the assumptions we are willing to impose
on the data. Nevertheless, the lack of data on labor participation of married women is not as
problematic as it seems, as national trends in female labor participation suggest that single
and widowed women drove the overall increase in female labor in the interwar period: while
the labor participation rates of married women remained roughly constant between 1911 and
1921, the participation rates of single and widowed women increased respectively from 67%
to 70%, and from 37% to 43%. Appendix figure B.5 shows the national trends in the share
of women in the labor force for each marital status between 1901 and 1936.
The Marriage Market as a Transmission Channel. To study the effect of military fatalities
on female labor participation through changes in marriage market conditions, we use tools
from the causal mediation framework.53 We assume throughout that single women and war
widows were in different marriage markets. For instance, we rule out the possibility that war
widows competed against young single women for a husband in the interwar period. This
whenever we have only two periods. We also compute clustered robust standard errors.
52We find exactly the same estimate as in Abramitzky et al. (2011, p. 136, table 2, column 2, row 2),
although our estimate is slightly more precisely estimated.
53This framework is presented in Imai et al. (2011), Imai and Yamamoto (2013) and Imai et al. (2013).
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Table 13.
OLS Estimates, Female Marital Status (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Panel A. Single (%) Panel B. Widow (%)
Age group: 20-29 30-39 40-49 20-29 30-39 40-49
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Death rate × post 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.14*** -0.00 0.09*** 0.17***
[0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04]
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.963 0.936 0.942 0.876 0.936 0.826
1911 mean 38.9 14.6 11.2 1.3 4.7 11.5
Table 13 notes: The dependent variable is the share of single women in columns 1-3
of panel A and the share of widowed women in columns 4-6 of panel B. Widow also
includes divorced women. Data for the following census-years: 1901, 1911, 1921,
1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural is the share of rural population in percents. Born in
de´p. is the share of the residing population born in the de´partement in percents.
See appendix K for details about variable sources and definitions. Standard errors
are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
assumption seems reasonable as war widows and young single women pertained to different
cohorts, and so did their potential husbands. Moreover, there is historical evidence that
most war widows did not re-marry.54 To render this assumption more plausible, we focus
on the younger single women (aged 20 to 29) and on the older widows (aged 30 to 49),
which were effectively in different marriage markets: for instance, in 1921, while 83% of
marriages of widows aged 30 to 49 involved a male spouse older than 30, 73% of of marriages
of single women aged 20 to 29 involved a male spouse younger than 30. To support this
point, appendix figure B.6 shows the evolution of the distribution of the age of male spouses
for these two categories of women between 1907 and 1936.
Under this assumption, we estimate the causal relationship between changes in mar-
riage market conditions and changes in female labor participation due to the war using the
54By 1923, about 140,000 war widows out of 600,000 were remarried, i.e., about 23% of war widows (Petit
2007, p. 129).
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following three equations:
singled,t = βS death rated × postt + θ′S Xd,t + γS,d + δS,t + εS,d,t
widowedd,t = βW death rated × postt + θ′W Xd,t + γW,d + δW,t + εW,d,t
FLPd,t = β1 death rated × postt + β2 singled,t + β3 widowedd,t + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t.
(10)
singled,t denotes the proportion of single women aged 20 to 29 in de´partement d at time
t. widowsd,t denotes the proportion of widowed women aged 30 to 49. The quantities of
interest are βˆ2×βˆS and βˆ3×βˆW .55 These quantities provide the effect of military fatalities on
female labor participation through each channel under a modified version of the “sequential
ignorability” assumption (Imai and Yamamoto 2013): we must be willing to assume that (1)
there are no differential trends in labor and marriage market outcomes across de´partements
with varying levels of military death rates, and that (2) conditionally on military death rate,
there are no differential trends in labor market outcomes across de´partements with varying
levels of marriage market outcomes. In the next paragraphs, we explain why it is reasonable
to impose these assumptions in our context, and then provide some baseline estimates.
The first set of assumptions is similar to the parallel trends assumption in a difference-in-
differences design. We already showed that this is a reasonable assumption relative to labor
market outcomes. To explore its validity relative to marriage market outcomes, appendix
figure B.7 shows the relative trends in the share of single women aged 20 to 29 (panel (a)),
and in the share of widowed women aged 30 to 49 (panel (b)) across groups of varying levels
of military death rates. We standardize the levels of each outcome variable to 100 in 1911 to
make the relative trends more apparent. There are no pre-war differential trends in the share
of single women. Regarding widows, de´partements that suffered higher military death rates
had a slight declining trend in the share of widowed women before the war. This suggests
that the baseline estimates of the effect of military fatalities on the proportion of widows
could be biased downward.
To check that pre-war differential trends do not drive the effect of military fatalities on
post-war marriage market outcomes, we use the same strategy as before: we compute year-
specific estimates, control for de´partement-specific linear trends, and combine the difference-
in-differences approach with an instrumental variable approach. First, we estimate the fol-
55An alternative way would be to add interactions to the third equation and only estimate FLPd,t =
β1 death rated×postt+β2 singled,t+β3 singled,t×death rated×post+β4 widowedd,t+β5 widowedd,t×
death rated × post + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εd,t. However, this method implicitly assumes that the effect of
military fatalities on female labor through marriage market outcomes was heterogeneous across levels of
military death rates, which need not be the case. See Imai et al. (2011, p. 784) for more details.
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lowing difference-in-differences specification:
Ya,d,t =
1936∑
t=1901
t 6=1911
βt death rated × yeart + θ′ Xd,t + γd + δt + εa,d,t, (11)
where Ya,d,t is the share of single women aged 20 to 29, or the share of widowed women aged
30 to 49 in de´partement d at time t. Moreover, we exclude the year 1911, and include a lead
(1901) to assess whether the results are driven by pre-war differential trends in marriage
market outcomes.56 We report the results in appendix table A.13. The coefficients on the
leads in all the columns suggest that pre-war trends in marriage market outcomes do not
drive the results as they are close to zero and not significant at conventional levels across
all marital statuses and all age groups. Moreover, the stability of the estimates suggest that
military fatalities affected marriage market outcomes throughout the interwar period. Also,
all the coefficients are in line with the results in table 13 and statistically significant at the
1% level in post-war years.
Table 14 reports the results from estimating equation 9 when controlling for de´partement-
specific linear trends (columns 2 and 5), and when using the instrumental variables strategy
(columns 3 and 6). Controlling for linear time trends yields the same results as the baseline
estimates in columns 1 and 4 for both types of women. The instrumental variables estimates
are also in line with the baseline estimates. Overall, our results suggest that the parallel
trend assumption for marriage market outcomes is reasonable in this context.
The second set of assumptions is that there are no differential trends in female labor par-
ticipation across de´partements with varying levels of marriage market outcomes conditional
on similar levels of military death rates. Exploring the validity of this assumption is difficult
as all units have different levels of military death rates. However, this set of assumptions
seems credible as de´partements with similar military death rates also display similar levels
and trends in female labor participation before the war. For instance, we show in appendix
figure B.8 that the trends in female labor participation across de´partements with medium
death rates but low and high marriage market outcome were the same in the case of single
women aged 20 to 29. For widows, it seems that de´partements with medium death rates and
low share of widows had a slight declining relative trend in female labor participation.
Table 15 reports the estimates of the third equation of specification 10 using three different
strategies: the baseline (panel A), controlling for de´partement-specific linear time trends
(panel B), and using an instrumental variable strategy (panel C). Estimating this equation
generates two types of interesting quantities: first, it shows how the coefficient on military
56As mentioned in footnote 51 on page 36, we do not have comparable marital status data for 1906.
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Table 14.
Robustness Checks, Female Marital Status (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Panel A. Single 20-29 (%) Panel B. Widows 30-49 (%)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Death rate × post 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.14***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.09] [0.03] [0.05] [0.03]
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement × Year No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.963 0.988 0.962 0.892 0.947 0.891
1911 mean 38.9 38.9 38.9 8.0 8.0 8.0
Table 14 notes: The dependent variable is the share of single women aged 20 to
29 in columns 1-3 of panel A and the share of widowed women aged 30 to 49 in
columns 4-6 of panel B. Widows also include divorced women. Data for the following
census-years: 1901, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Rural is the share of rural
population in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing population born in
the de´partement in percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources and
definitions. Standard errors are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement
level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant
at the 10 percent level.
death rates (β̂1) changes onces we include marriage market outcomes in the equation.
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Second, it describes the effect of changes in the marriage market on female labor market
outcomes (β̂2 and β̂3).
We interpret the meaning of these results in table 16 where we provide for each specifica-
tion the corresponding quantities of interest β̂2× β̂S and β̂3× β̂W , as well as the share of the
total effect of military fatalities on female labor that the marriage market channel can ex-
plain. Conditional on the assumptions imposed on the data, the baseline results imply that
in de´partements that suffered a military death rate of 20% rather than 10%, female labor
57We reproduce the following coefficients for means of comparison, except that we exclude year 1906 to run
the analysis on similar samples: the coefficient in panel A, column 1, corresponds to the coefficient from
panel A, column 4, of table 7; the coefficient in panel B, column 1, corresponds to the coefficient from
panel A, column 4, of table 9; the coefficient in panel C, column 1, corresponds to the coefficient from
column 5 of table 11.
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Table 15.
The Marriage Market Channel (1901-1936)
Dependent variable: Female Labor Participation (FLP)
A. Baseline B. Trends C. IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Death rate × post 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.40** 0.32* 0.54*** 0.41***
[0.08] [0.07] [0.17] [0.18] [0.13] [0.14]
Share single 20-29 0.24*** 0.30** 0.19***
[0.07] [0.12] [0.07]
Share widows 30-49 0.55** 0.01 0.40**
[0.23] [0.20] [0.20]
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement × Year No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.948 0.952 0.975 0.977 0.946 0.950
1911 FLP mean 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4
Table 15 notes: The dependent variable is female labor participation. Data for the
following census-years: 1901, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, and 1936. Share single 20-29
captures the share of women aged 20 to 29 that are single. Share widowed 30-49
captures the share of women aged 30 to 49 that are widows or divorced. Rural is
the share of rural population in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing
population born in the de´partement in percents. See appendix K for details about
variable sources and definitions. Standard errors are in brackets, and are clustered
at the de´partement level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Signif-
icant at the 10 percent level.
participation was 0.65 percentage point higher because of women aged 20 to 29 not marrying
because of the war (10 × 0.27 × 0.24 ' 0.65), and 0.67 percentage point higher because of
women aged 30 to 49 who lost their husband because of the war (10× 0.12× 0.55 ' 0.67).
These two channels explain together about 38% of the effect of military fatalities on female
labor participation.
B. Demand Factors: Male Scarcity and Substitution Toward Female Labor
The scarcity of men in the interwar period could have induced firms to increase their
demand for female labor as an input factor to substitute male labor. In a partial equilibrium
42
Table 16.
Interpreting the Results in Table 15
Baseline Trends IV
Share single 20-29 β̂2 × β̂S 0.07 0.08 0.07
Share widows 30-39 β̂3 × β̂W 0.07 0.00 0.06
Share of total effect 37% 20% 24%
Table 16 notes: The coefficients are calculated using tables 14
and 15. For instance, in column 1, β̂2 × β̂S = 0.27 × 0.24 '
0.065, β̂3 × β̂W = 0.12 × 0.55 ' 0.067 and 1 − (0.22/0.35) '
0.37.
framework, an increase in real wage could uncover this phenomenon. However, we docu-
mented that women increased their labor supply after the war. As a result, there is little
we can say about changes in labor demand by examining changes in wage rates. On the one
hand, should we find that de´partements that suffered higher death rates also experienced a
rise in the real wage of women, then we would conclude that the increase in labor demand
was strong enough to overcompensate the depressing effect of rising female labor supply on
wages. On the other hand, should we find that the real wage of women decreased, we would
only be able to conclude the potential increase in labor demand was not large enough to
compensate the effect of increased labor supply on wages.
To assess the possibility of substitution toward female labor, we collected data on male
and female daily wage rates at the de´partement level between 1896 and 1924. We also
collected a series of prices at the de´partement level to compute real wages. We further
explore alternative channels of substitution: foreign labor, as measured by the labor force
participation of foreigners, and physical capital, as measured by the number of boilers,
machines, and total horse power (in thousands of kW) in a de´partement’s firms between
1908 and 1926.58
We estimate equation 2 where instead of female labor participation, the outcome is
either (log) female real wage, (log) male real wage, or the ratio of male to female real wage.
We report the results in table 17. We find that female real wages slightly decreased in
de´partements that suffered relatively more military fatalities, although the coefficient is not
precisely estimated (column 1). It is unclear whether military fatalities had an impact on
male wages (column 2). Overall, male wages seem to have increased relative to female wages
in de´partements that suffered relatively more military fatalities, although this relationship is
not significant at conventional levels (column 3). This suggests that if there was an increase
58 See appendix K for a description of the sources of these data.
43
in female labor demand in de´partements that experienced a higher male scarcity after the
war, this increase was small and did not compensate the depressing effect of rising female
labor supply on wages. These suggestive findings are consistent with the interpretation that
firms did not replace male labor with alternative forms of labor such as female labor as
firms did not substitute toward foreign labor either (column 4). Instead, it seems that in
de´partements that suffered more from military fatalities, firms substituted toward physical
capital (columns 5 and 6). The results in column 7 suggest that the efficiency of this new
physical capital did not improve.
Table 17.
The Substitution Channel (1896-1926)
Panel A. 1896-1924 Panel B. 1908-1926
Dependent variable: Female Male Ratio Foreign Horse
wage wage M/F labor Boilers Machines power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Death rate × post -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.11 0.02** 0.04*** -0.00
[0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.28] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Rural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Born in de´p. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
De´partement FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520 520 522 261 261 261 261
De´partements 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.520 0.753 0.253 0.797 0.960 0.961 0.908
1911 mean 2.27 4.76 2.19 35.0 1,176 937 26.55
Table 17 notes: The dependent variable is real female daily wage in Francs (base 1911)
in column 1, real male daily wage in Francs (base 1911) in column 2, the ratio of male to
female real daily wage in column 3, the labor participation rate of foreigners in percents
in column 4, the number of boilers per de´partement in column 5, the number of machines
per de´partement in column 6, and the total horse power per firm in thousands of kW in
column 7. Data for the following years in columns 1-3: 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, and
1924. Data for the following years in columns 4-7: 1908, 1911, 1921, and 1926. Rural is the
share of rural population in percents. Born in de´p. is the share of the residing population
born in the de´partement in percents. See appendix K for details about variable sources
and definitions. Standard errors are in brackets, and are clustered at the de´partement
level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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C. Alternative Mechanisms
In this section, we examine whether the war affected female labor participation through
alternative channels related to the entrance of women into the labor force during the war.
This could have affected subsequent female labor participation through two mechanisms.
First, women who entered the labor force during the war could have increased their level
of human capital, or updated their beliefs about the labor market, which could have in
turn increased female labor participation after the war. A similar phenomenon has been
widely documented in the case of the post-WWII period in the U.S.59 Another possibility
is that men’s beliefs about women’s abilities to work changed because women successfully
took on typically male responsibilities during the war, thereby increasing the demand for
female labor. We explore these potential mechanisms, and show that neither is correlated
with military fatalities. Further, neither mechanism triggered any change in female labor
participation during the interwar period.
Female Labor During the War. The increase in female labor during the war could have
affected female labor after the war. The war period in France can broadly be divided into four
phases: a phase of complete industrial disorganization between August 1914 and January
1915, a phase of progressive industrial mobilization between January 1915 and November
1918, a phase of industrial demobilization between November 1918 and November 1919,
and a phase of recovery between November 1919 and October 1922. In August 1914, all
belligerent nations were convinced that the war would be short: since the middle of the
nineteenth century, it was believed that the successful military strategies had to conduct an
extremely strong initial offensive that would destroy the opponent in a short period of time
(Reboul 1925). For this reason, the French plan of military mobilization of 1912 did not
mention any specifics regarding the industrial organization that was supposed to support a
potentially long war. As a result, a large part of the French industrial system came close
to paralysis in August 1914. We document this phenomenon in figure 9 where we show the
evolution of the number of operating firms along with male and female employment levels
in the industrial sector throughout the war. To make the evolution of these three variables
more apparent, we standardize their levels to 100 just before the war. Compared to July
1914, only 53% of all industrial firms were still operating in August 1914, and male and
female employment were respectively down to 32% and 43% of their pre-war levels.
By the end of August 1914, the first month of the war, the French army had already lost
59See Goldin (1991), Acemoglu et al. (2004), Goldin and Olivetti (2013), Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015),
and Cook-Stuntz (2015).
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Figure 9. Labor During WWI (August 1914 - October 1920)
Figure 9 notes: Female indicates the number of women working in the industrial sector, Male indicates the
number of men working in the industrial sector, and Firms indicates the number of operating firms in the
industrial sector. We normalize the pre-war level for all outcomes to 100 in July 1914. See appendix K for
details about variable sources and definitions.
about 200,000, men amounting to 15% of total military fatalities. The military command
soon realized that the war would last longer than expected, and that its industrial plan to
support the ongoing war effort was highly insufficient. For instance, while it had planned
to produce about 13,000 shells per day at the beginning of the war, the troops were using
150,000 shells per day in combat by January 1915 (Porte 2005, pp. 66-67). To manage the
extended needs of the army, the military command centralized all the industrial effort to
supply the troops under the State Secretariat of Artillery and Ammunitions from November
1915, and started to coordinate a vast network of public and private industrial firms.60
Moreover, the government incentivized firms to employ alternative forms of labor such as
women, immigrants, and war prisoners.61 As a result, the number of women working in
the industrial sector exceeded its pre-war level by 1916. This phenomenon was especially
salient in sectors that directly supplied weapons and machineries to the army. For instance,
in the metallurgic sector, the number of working women exceeded its pre-war level as early
as January 1915. By July 1917, it exceeded its pre-war level by a factor 7 in this sector.
Appendix table A.14 provides a comprehensive view of the evolution of the number of working
60This Secretary was created by the Order of November 3rd, 1915 (see the Journal Officiel de la Re´publique
Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 47 (306), pp. 8108-8109, dated November 11th, 1915).
61Ciruclaire of the Ministe`re de la Guerre of November 10th, 1915 (see the Journal Officiel de la Re´publique
Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 47 (306), p. 8110, dated November 11th, 1915).
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women in various industrial sectors throughout the war. At the end of the war, the need for
new equipments vanished. Moreover, the government issued laws to help soldiers return to
their pre-war job, and even offered a monetary lump sum equivalent to a month worth of pay
to any woman who would quit her job in war industries.62 As a result, female employment
in the industrial sector dropped to below its pre-war level by the end of 1919. Shortly after,
however, employment levels rose again mainly because of the reconstruction effort in the
territories that were directly damaged by the war.
These changes in female labor during the war were uncorrelated with military death
rates. In particular, we show in panel A of appendix table A.15 that the de´partements that
experienced the highest spikes in female labor during the war did not suffer systematically
more nor less military fatalities. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether women who entered
the labor force during the war to work in war industries kept working after the war. If this
were the case, we should see a positive relationship between the spike in female labor during
the war and changes in female labor before and after the war. To measure the local spikes
in female labor, we use the level of female employment in the industrial sector in July 1917
relative to July 1914, as it was the time in which female labor was the highest (see figure
9).63 In appendix figure B.9, we show the relative trends in female labor in places that
experienced a high and a low increase in female labor during the war. De´partements that
experienced a higher increase in female labor during the war did not experience any post-war
increase in female labor. We find the same results when estimating difference-in-difference
regressions: in columns 1 and 2 of panel A of appendix table A.16, we show that changes in
female labor during the war were not correlated with any post-war increase in female labor.
These findings are consistent with historical accounts of labor inspectors from that time,
who systematically described in their reports how male managers assigned basic tasks to
women by decomposing men’s work into smaller, easier tasks. For instance, a report of
January 1918 describes: “[t]o make female labor possible and enable them to replace men,
industrialists have, in many regions, modified and improved their managing methods. They
divide the labor to the extreme, organize the production in series and assign female workers
to very delimited tasks” (Bulletin du Ministe`re du Travail et de la Pre´voyance sociale, 25
62The law of November 22nd, 1918, ensured that soldiers could claim their pre-war job: “The administrations,
offices, public, or private firms must guarantee to their mobilized personnel [...] the occupation that all had
at the moment of its mobilization” (Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, Lois et De´crets, 50 (320),
pp. 10120-10121, dated November 24th, 1918). In November 1918, the Ministry of Armament was telling
female workers: “[b]y coming back to you previous occupations, you will be useful to your country as you
have been by working in war industries in the past four years. [...] Each [female] worker who expresses
the will to quit ones firm before December 5th, 1918, will receive the amount of thirty days of salary as a
severance pay” (Bulletin du Ministe`re du Travail, 1919, pp. 45*-46*).
63Our results are robust to using alternative dates to measure the spike in female labor during the war.
47
(1), 1918, p. 11). Because of such extreme division of labor, women could hardly acquire
human capital transferable to other sectors after the war.
Changes in Men’s Beliefs about Gender Roles. The war could have increased female labor
in the post-war period by changing men’s beliefs about gender roles. For instance, men could
have updated their beliefs about women’s abilities because of women’s positive role during
the war in industries or in farming. To measure how men’s beliefs about gender roles changed
before and after the war, we use depute´s’ support to the extension of the suffrage to women.
We build on the fact that the extension of the suffrage to women was discussed before and
after the war in the Assemble´e Nationale. Women did not have the right to vote prior the
war. However, this matter was the subject of much debates. In fact, a proposal to extend
the suffrage to women—the Dussaussoy-Buisson bill—was supposed to be voted on in 1915,
but the war interrupted the legislative process. This bill was eventually voted on in May
1919, and adopted by 324 votes against 87 at the Assemble´e Nationale.64 This phenomenon
is not specific to France: Hicks (2013) finds that wars in the twentieth century doubled the
likelihood for a belligerent country to grant women with the right to vote within one year
following the conflict.
We collected data on the public support of de´pute´s to the extension of the suffrage to
women before the war from an open letter written by several women’s rights organizations
addressed to the Assemble´e Nationale. This letter was published in June 1914.65 The data
for the vote on the extension of female suffrage in May 1919 are from the reports of the
debates in the Assemble´e Nationale.66 We then constructed an average support for female
suffrage at the de´partement level before and after the war by aggregating supports and vote
choices of de´pute´s from each de´partement. Appendix table A.17 reports these measures
together with the data at the individual de´pute´ level. While only 30% of de´pute´s supported
female suffrage before the war, about 80% did so after the war.
This measure may not adequately capture men’s beliefs about gender roles. First, the
views of a de´partement’s de´pute´s may not represent the views of the de´partement’s general
population. Moreover, it may capture only a subset of men’s beliefs about gender roles, such
as women’s abilities as voters. To alleviate the later concern, we build a measure of religious
conservatism before the war at the de´partement level. Presumably, religious conservatism
and beliefs about gender roles should be correlated. For instance, Przeworski (2009) finds
64This bill eventually did not become a law because it was rejected by the Se´nat, France’s upper house, in
1923. Bougle´-Moalic (2012) provides a historical account of the extension of female suffrage in France.
65A copy of this letter is available in appendix L.
66See the Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, De´bats Parlementaires, 11e Le´gislature, Session ordi-
naire de 1919, pp. 2365-2366, dated May 20th, 1919.
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that countries that were more Catholic tended to adopt female suffrage later in the course of
their history. To measure religious conservatism at the local level, we use de´pute´s’ votes on
the Loi de 1905, which separated the Church from the State in 1905. This law is particularly
relevant for our purpose because it was one of the most disputed laws in France’s political
history. We collected the data on the votes of each de´pute´ from the reports of the debates
in the Assemble´e Nationale.67 We show in appendix table A.18 the correlation between the
votes for the Loi de 1905 and the support to the extensions of the suffrage to women in June
1914, and the votes in May 1919. De´partements in which de´pute´s supported the separation
of the Church from the State in 1905 also supported the extension of female suffrage before
the war more often. No such relationship exists after the war, suggesting that local attitudes
changed after the conflict. Our findings suggest that the support to the extension of the
suffrage to women is a reasonable measure for local conservatism toward gender roles.
Changes in the support to the extension of the suffrage to women are uncorrelated with
military death rates: de´partements in which de´pute´s switched their support for female suf-
frage did not suffer systematically more nor less military fatalities (see panel B of appendix
table A.15). Moreover, plotting the trends in female labor across varying changes in support
reveals no relationship (see appendix figure B.10). This is confirmed by the results from
difference-in-differences regressions (see columns 3 and 4 of panel A of appendix table A.16).
Overall, our findings suggest that changes in labor supply due to military fatalities during
WWI caused a rise in female labor participation throughout the interwar period. Neither
labor demand channels, nor female labor during the war, nor changes in men’s views about
gender roles help explain the patterns we find in the data. The labor supply channel is the
only plausible mechanism that we identified given the data available.
VI. Conclusion
We construct a unique dataset of military fatalities and de´partement characteristics, and
use it to show that the shortage of men induced by WWI increased female labor participation.
In particular, de´partements with military death rates of 20% rather than 10% experienced an
increase in female labor participation of about 12% compared to pre-war levels. This effect
is stable throughout the interwar period, and robust to alternative empirical strategies. Our
findings show that the effect is generated by changes in labor supply. In particular, many
young single women as well as war widows entered the labor force. Neither changes in labor
demand, nor female labor during the war, nor changes in men’s views about gender roles
67Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise, De´bats Parlementaires, 8e Le´gislature, Session ordinaire de
1905, pp. 2701-2707, dated July 3rd, 1905.
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can explain the patterns we observe in the data.
A broad literature has analyzed the impact of war mobilization and war casualties on
female labor participation. It has mostly focused on the impact of WWII mobilization
in the U.S. In general, this literature finds that war mobilization during WWII increased
female labor supply in the 1950s and 1960s (Goldin 1991, Acemoglu et al. 2004, Goldin and
Olivetti 2013). In comparison, the magnitude of military fatalities in France during WWI
enables us to focus on the impact of permanent rather than temporary imbalances in sex
ratio. Moreover, we find no decline of the effect throughout the interwar period, and no
evidence that women who entered the labor force during the war kept working after the
war. Overall, our findings challenge both the popular belief that the war “liberated” women,
and the consensus among historians that it was a mere “parenthesis” for female labor (see
footnote 7 on page 7): instead, the missing men set off a mechanism that induced women
to enter low-skilled industrial jobs after the war.
This paper evaluates the effects of gender imbalances on female labor participation by
analyzing one particular event of history. More broadly, war, sex-selective abortion, and
mass migration have altered gender balances throughout the world and throughout history.
Our results may help to understand the consequences of such imbalances to labor markets.
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